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The question of the character of 
the essence of material beings is one 
of the basic topics of Thomas Aqui-
nas’s metaphysics. We could even say 
that answering this question and de-
veloping an adequate term for the 
essence of material beings is funda-
mental not only for metaphysics, but 
can also play a considerable role in 
Thomas Aquinas’s philosophical psy-
chology, which makes it important to 
everybody who is engaged in Thom-
as’s psychological legacy. The impor-
tance of the topic of the essence of 
material beings arises from Thom-
as’s psychology, primarily because 
Thomas Aquinas advocates a notice-
ably anti-dualistic anthropological 
position, which forces him to prop-
erly explain the metaphysically complex being that man is, which may 
on the physical level alone seem impossible.1 The topic of the essence of 
1 Compare with E. Stump, Non-Cartesian substance dualism and materialism without 
reductionism, “Faith and Philosophy” 12 (1995), p. 505–531; R. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human 
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material beings is, however, still not elaborated sufficiently. In other words, 
there are still two questions which have not been properly answered as 
far as my knowledge of literature extends: a) how matter is comprehend-
ed in the essence of concrete beings; b) how it is possible to combine the 
presupposition of a soul which is indivisible and at the same time the 
intellect and the form of the body. We consider that without a thorough 
analysis of the first question, we cannot reach a satisfactory resolution of 
the second question, which is key to all Thomas’s psychology.
The purpose of this article is to suggest an interpretation of the term of 
the essence of material beings in the larger context of Thomas’s psychol-
ogy that complies with these requirements: a) historical-philosophical 
coherence, by which we mean primarily a meaningful categorization 
of the elaborated concept into the historical-philosophical framework; 
b) metaphysical coherence and c) philosophical-psychological coherence. 
These requirements create at the same time a perspective on the concept 
of the essence of material beings that we will engage in while limiting our 
examination to the early work of Thomas, De ente et essentia.
Basic term definition in De ente et essentia 
Each examination of Thomas’s work that tries to take the development 
of his system into consideration has to start with a short but extremely 
meaty tract, De ente et essentia (here referred to as De ente).2 This early 
work mirrors most of the prime decisions on fundamental philosophi-
cal questions that further define the overall character of his philosophy.3
nature, Cambridge 2004, p. 19: “Human beings are part spiritual and part physical (‘…human beings, 
who are composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance’: STh, q. 75. pr.), which gives us a theoreti-
cally perplexing kind of dual status – we are metaphysical amphibians, to borrow Eleonore Stump’s 
apt phrase. This unique dual status makes us especially interesting in many ways […].”
2 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 43: De ente et 
essentia, Roma 1976, p. 315–381; all other works of Thomas Aquinas are quoted according to the 
online edition at www.corpusthomisticum.org.
3 We believe the most important topics of De ente et essentia are mainly: a) establish-
ment of a real distinction between essentia/esse; b) critical (logical-metaphysical) analysis of the 
theory of the form pluralism. As concerns the form pluralism theory compare: R. Zavalloni, Rich-
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The study of De ente is, however, important not only from the meta-
physical point of view as the title may suggest but also from the logical-
-semantic and also psychological-anthropological view.4 It is important 
for the latter for three reasons. First, the psychology inspired by Aristotle 
will to a certain extent always be a part of physics and metaphysics. The 
theory of the structure of a being working with the concept of a form then 
always testifies to the composition of man and the soul itself again from 
two points of view – from the metaphysical point of view, where we ask 
in what relation the concept of form is to the concept of essence and be-
ing, and from the physical point of view, where we understand form in 
relation to matter. Second, in De ente we can already find the basic double 
relation to the human soul according to Thomas Aquinas (soul as form 
and soul as motor). It is certainly not completely distinct and obvious at 
first glance, but in the context of further examinations it makes sense to 
register these allusions. We could also describe it in the following way. 
The dualistic tendency in the concept of the soul that Thomas criticizes 
most radically in Questiones disputatae de anima, where he refuses to 
define the soul as simply hoc aliquid, can point to the fact that already 
in De ente distinct differences in the understanding soul are ignored in 
ard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes, Louvain 1951; C. B. Bazán, The human 
soul: form and substance? Thomas Aquinas’ critique of eclectic Aristotelianism, “Archives d’Histoire 
Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge” 64 (1997), p. 95–126.
4 De ente, pr. 1–15: “Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, secundum philo-
sophum in I caeli et mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit 
Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae, ideo ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum 
difficultatem aperiendam dicendum est quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur et quomodo in 
diversis inveniatur et quomodo se habeat ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et differen-
tiam. Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus et ex posterioribus in pri-
ora devenire, ut, a facilioribus incipientes, convenientior fiat disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis 
ad significationem essentiae procedendum est.” Compare with J. Lehrberger, The anthropology of 
Aquinas’s “De ente et essentia”, “The Review of Metaphysics” 51 (1998), p. 829–47; p. 831: “Clearly, 
the standpoint in these early chapters is natural philosophy, while the horizon of the later chapters 
is metaphysics. Any interpretation of Thomas’s teaching on the human soul in the De ente et essen-
tia which neglects the developmental character of the work, ignores its shift from physics to meta-
physics, or treats its initial formulations as final syntheses, distorts his understanding.”
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various contexts. Third, metaphysics provides a point of departure and 
principles for all other theoretical sciences.5
From this it arises that even our analysis of this paper will be guided 
by two main standpoints: a) from the point of view of a change in the 
concept of form in Thomas Aquinas’s work in comparison to his predeces-
sors; b) from the point of view of the relation of form to the metaphysical 
question of the real distinction between essence and being. 
In the introductory part of De ente, where Thomas Aquinas introduces 
us to the possible meanings of the concept of essence (essentia) which we 
can come across in the older philosophic tradition, he is highly instructive 
and he points to the bounds within which our contemplations on essence 
should move.6 The term essence thus has mainly the following meanings: 
a) the essence belongs to the being (ens) that we explain in the first way, 
i.e. categorically. In this sense, something positive is defined in contrast 
with privation (privatio), which can however be thought and thus their 
concepts may play the role of a subject in terms of judgment, but their 
ontological status lies only in the limitation of the essence defined only 
positively;7 b) the essence moreover gained in the tradition the follow-
ing terms and meanings:
5 Compare with Contra Gentiles, III, c. 25: “Hoc autem modo se habet philosophia pri-
ma ad alias scientias speculativas, nam ab ipsa omnes aliae dependent, utpote ab ipsa accipientes 
sua principia et directionem contra negantes principia, ipsaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur 
ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad ultimum finem, unde et scientia divina nominatur.”
6 The topic and the method of its elaboration as found in De ente refers to and resem-
bles in many aspects the teaching of Avicenna. We should not forget that Thomas Aquinas did not 
see the origin of the teachings on the plurality of forms in Avicenna as contemporary scholars do, 
although for instance in Summa Theologiae Iª, q. 76 a. 4 ad 4 we can read: “Ad quartum dicendum 
quod Avicenna possuit formas substantiales elementorum integras remanere in mixto, mixtionem 
autem fieri secundum quod contrariae qualitates elementorum reducuntur ad medium. Sed hoc est 
impossibile.” 
7 De ente, c. 1., 14–26: “Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dic-
to, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed 
sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens pri-
mo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum di-
viditur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per 
quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia ho-
minis, et sic de aliis.” Here Thomas mentions two methods out of three that define being in Aristo-
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i) quiddity (quidditas) – to what extent it is palpable by definition and 
intellect, and to what extent it defines being in its due genus and species;8
ii) “whatness” (quod-quid-erat-esse) – to what extent the being has an 
existence through it;
iii) form – to what extent it is a certainty (certitudo) of every thing;9
iv) nature (natura) – to what extent it is a principle of being, that we 
can recognize by intellect.10
Before giving his own definition, Thomas considers it important to 
mention these meanings that are similar in some aspects but different in 
others. Let’s focus first on what should be considered as a common fea-
ture that is characteristic for any understanding of the concept of essence. 
This feature is primarily intelligibility. Each of the mentioned meanings 
considers certain ways of understanding essence by intellect. Their com-
mon base is, however, always the intelligibility of this principle. This fea-
ture is a trivial acknowledgment in relation to essences but below we can 
tle’s work: a) from the point of view of categories; b) from the point of view of possibility and real-
ity; c) from the point of view of truthfulness. For Aristotle and his concept of being see Aristotle, 
Metaphys., IX, 1045b 32–3.
8 De ente, c. 1., 27–31: “Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel spe-
cie, est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essen-
tiae a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur.”
9 De ente, c. 1., 31–36: “Et hoc est quod philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat 
esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam 
significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II metaphysicae suae.” For the con-
cept of certitudo compare with e.g. Avicenna, Metaphysica, ed. Van Riet, Louvain 1977–1992, III, 
5; Metaphys. I, 6: “Redeamus igitur et dicamus quod de his que manifesta sunt est hoc quod un-
aqueque res habet certitudinem propriam quae est ejus quidditas […] unaquaeque res habet certi-
tudinem qua est id quod est.”
10 De ente, c. 1., 36–45: “Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam se-
cundum primum modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in libro De duabus naturis assignat, 
secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non 
enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam. Et sic etiam philosophus dicit in 
V metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est natura.” Compare with. Boethius, De Persona at duabus 
naturis, [in:] Manlii Severini Boetii Opera omnia, tomus posterior, accurante J.-P. Migne, Parisiis 
1847 (Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina [=PL], 64), c. 1, col. 1341 BC: “Nam si de om-
nibus rebus naturam dici placet, talis definitio dabitur, quae res omnes quae sunt possit includere. 
Erit ergo hujusmodi: Natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquomodo capi possunt.” 
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see that it makes sense to always keep this basic feature in mind.11 The 
manner itself by which Thomas Aquinas introduces us to the topic also 
seems to suggest that he emphasizes mainly the fact that no matter how we 
understand essence, it is always what is primarily related to the intellect. 
Let’s now focus on the differences in each of the meanings. We should 
add here that these differences must be understood rather as different 
aspects of the same concept. What they have in common is that they do 
not so much accept intelligibility alone but rather the manner of its real-
ization in beings. The quod-quid-erat-esse together with the form refers to 
Aristotle’s theory of hylemorphism. Here Thomas Aquinas clearly dem-
onstrates that he is aware of the identity of essence and form in Aristotle’s 
work. We should not forget this fact while analyzing De ente. Certitudo 
in Avicenna’s work plays a similar role as the principle of being, form.12 
No less important is the connection of the meaning of essence with the 
concept of nature (natura). Here Thomas Aquinas states first the Bo-
ethius definition − what is important, however, is its development and 
specification, which relates the principle of intelligibility to the concrete 
existence of being.13 
11 The first sentence in the foreword contains the following assertion: “…ens et essentia 
sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in primo libro suae Metaphysicae, …” 
It seems then that the aspect of intelligibility cannot be overrated, especially when we realize that 
not only the human intellect is involved. For the topic of the first concepts of reasoning see É. Gil-
son, Élements d´une métaphysique Thomisté de l´être, “Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire 
du Moyen Age” 40 (1973), p. 7–36. Worth mentioning from the point of view of the first concept is 
mainly the work of Jan A. Aertsen who provides the following interpretation of the concept of es-
sentia in Thomas’s introduction in De ente et essetntia. According to Aertsen we need to understand 
the concept of essentia in the sense of the term res, which of course belongs to the transcendental. 
From our point of view it is important that the terms ens and res define the same but secundum ra-
tionem differs. This in our context means that being is taken in the aspect of its existence (ens) and 
also in the aspect of its definiteness (res). The aspect of the definiteness of things is defined with 
the term essentia. This means that we always talk about the principle of being and not about being. 
Compare with J. A. Aertsen, Medieval philosophy and the transcendentals: the case of Thomas Aqui-
nas, Leiden 1996, p. 159–160. 
12 Compare with fn. 10.
13 De ente, c. 1, 45–53: “Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare 
essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria 
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The mentioned meanings that Thomas Aquinas provides before his 
own examination of the concept of essence are oriented towards two areas. 
We need to understand essence as an intelligible principle of the definite-
ness (certitudo) of every being and at the same time we need to under-
stand it as a principle that ontologically founds each individual being.
This introduction will allow us to evaluate one of the most important 
terminological settings in De ente, where Thomas Aquinas claims that 
neither form nor matter is essence. By this he unambiguously stands in 
contrast to Aristotle’s theory, which considers form and essence identical 
to a certain degree.14 This thesis is completed further on by another one. 
Because in the definition of natural beings we need to lay down matter, 
the essence of these beings has to contain matter too:
Patet ergo, quod essentia comprehendit et materiam et formam.15
In his reasoning of this thesis, Thomas Aquinas builds on Aristo-
tle’s problem of the definition of material beings and its resolution in 
operatione destituatur. Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. 
Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.”
14 As it usually is with the precise definition of meanings of terms in Aristotle’s work, we 
can for instance mention here the term substance, here we have to point out the fact that essence 
also can be understood in two ways: a) one where essence identifies with form, which in this pa-
per we consider from the methodological point of view as the base, as it enables us to capture the 
changes in the understanding of the concept of a form in Thomas Aquinas, which then happened 
in connection to overpassing the physical framework by means of the real distinction and also by 
accepting Avicenna’s concept of corporeal form (forma corporeitatis); b) the second one where we 
find such notes in Aristotle’s work that at least complicate the mentioned identification. Compare 
with Aristotle, Phys., III, 192a9; 194a12; Metaphys., VII, 128b33. 
15 De ente, c. 2, 24–25; In Metaphysic., lib. 5 l. 10 n. 5: “Quartum modum ponit ibi ampli-
us quod dicit quod etiam quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, dicitur substantia uniuscuiusque. 
Haec autem quidditas sive rei essentia, cuius definitio est ratio, differt a forma quam dixit esse sub-
stantiam in secundo modo, sicut differt humanitas ab anima. Nam forma est pars essentiae vel quid-
ditatis rei. Ipsa autem quidditas vel essentia rei includit omnia essentialia principia. Et ideo genus 
et species dicuntur esse substantia eorum, de quibus praedicantur, hoc ultimo modo. Nam genus 
et species non significant tantum formam, sed totam rei essentiam.” Compare with É. Gilson, Éle-
ments d’une métaphysique Thomisté de l’être, p. 15; J. F. Wippel, The metaphysic thoughts of Thomas 
Aquinas, Washington 2000, p. 203. 
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Avicenna’s16 and Averroes’s work.17 Like Aristotle, Avicenna also real-
ized that the definition cannot be constituted from components that do 
not create a unity. This incentive then outbalanced the other problem 
Aristotle’s theory cannot cope with, which Avicenna’s can but at a price 
that he has to pay for in introducing corporeal form (forma corporeita-
tis). The main problem of Aristotle and Avicenna was how to combine 
the following two requirements: a) the definition of natural beings must 
contain matter; b) the form of material things is captured in a definition 
through intellect, which is of course immaterial. It seems that a paradox 
is created, which in Aristotle’s system, is very difficult to resolve. Averroes, 
on the other hand, followed the line form-concept-definition, but at the 
price of breaking the unity of the resulting definition of material things.18 
16 Compare with De ente, c. 2, 14–17: “Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non 
tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae 
non differrent.”
17 Compare with De ente, c. 2, 17–25: “Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione sub-
stantiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus 
diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, quae perfectam essentiam non habent. Unde oportet quod 
in diffinitione sua subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia com-
prehendit materiam et formam.” Compare with In Metaphysic. lib. 7 l. 9 n. 8.: “Ad evidentiam au-
tem horum, quae in hoc capitulo dicuntur, sciendum est, quod circa definitiones rerum, et earum 
essentias duplex est opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut 
quod tota essentia hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt, quod eadem secundum rem est forma 
totius quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed 
differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum quod perficit materiam, 
et facit eam esse in actu: forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per eam in spe-
cie collocatur. Et ex hoc volunt, quod nullae partes materiae ponantur in definitione indicante spe-
ciem, sed solum principia formalia speciei. Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorumdam sequen-
tium eum.” 
18 Averroes interprets Aristotle in a way that is substantial for us. That is that form is sys-
tematically related to matter and not with its intelligible content. Thomas, in his Commentary on 
the Metaphysics, to a certain extent advocates Averroes’s position in the interpretation of Aristotle’s 
text, but we as philosophers should go beyond the mere interpretation. According to Thomas, this 
step was done by Avicenna, which he shows by leaning towards his teachings in this question. Com-
pare with Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysic., 7 l. 9 n. 8: “Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorum-
dam sequentium eum. Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis.” Compare with A. A. Maurer, 
Form and essence in the philosophy of St. Thomas, “Mediaeval Studies” 13 (1951), p. 175: “Howev-
er, even though Aristotle identified quiddity with form, we find tendencies and suggestions in his 
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According to him, the definition of a material thing takes matter as the 
subiectum, as something that introduces into the definition of material 
things a relation which is between substance and accident.
Avicenna resolved this problem by introducing corporeal form (for-
ma corporeitatis).19 As we need to determine matter within categories, 
it needs to have its form even if the form is not complete. In this way 
matter gets into the definition of material things without the full intel-
ligibility of this definition and the ontological principle of form or de-
finiteness being threatened. Here we also need to mention the relation 
between essence and form in Avicenna’s work. The essence of all things 
corresponds to the forms that compose the given thing. The model of 
this composition is componential. It can be said that the logical order 
corresponds to the ontological one. At this point, we don’t need to en-
gage in the relation of Thomas Aquinas to this componential model, i.e. 
to the theory of plurality of forms. What is, however, important in this 
context is that Thomas Aquinas adopts the concept of corporeal form.20 
philosophy which point to the integration of matter in quiddity. It is these which St. Thomas seizes 
upon and develops, leading the Stagirite into avenues unknown to himself.”
19 We believe that the concept of a corporeal form (forma corporeitatis) is key in under-
standing how matter can be a part of the definitions and thus also the essence of Avicenna and 
Thomas Aquinas. Avicenna is considered the father of this concept which, however, outside the con-
text of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas signalizes the pluralism of forms. Avicenna introduced 
the concept of corporeal form mainly to be able to describe categorically the first matter. By doing 
this, he equipped it with a minimal level of intelligibility. Thomas Aquinas kept the term corpore-
al form but he liberated it from the pluralistic context. A corporeal form is then according to him 
all the forms that result in three dimensions. He preserved the term and definition of the concept 
but refused the pluralism of forms and the logical-ontological model of the reality from which it is 
formed. This is also one of the main topics in De ente et essentia. On the concept of corporeal form 
compare with A. Hyman, Aristotle’s ‘first matter’ and Avicenna’s and Averroes’ ‘corporeal form’, [in:] 
Harry Austryn Wolfson jubilee volume, vol. 1, Jerusalem 1965, p. 385–406; P. Slováček, Corporeal 
form and the human soul in Thomas Aquinas’ work, “The Czech and Slovak Journak of Humanities: 
Philosophica” 1 (2001), s. 8–28; R. Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la plurali-
té des formes, p. 428: „La conception avicennienne de la forme corporelle, la doctrine de la perma-
nence des éléments dans le mixte et celle de la hiérarchie des âmes nous permet de considérer le 
philosophe arabe comme un véritable précurseur de lathéorie pluraliste.“
20 Compare with e.g. De ente, c. 4, 30–33: “Et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma 
corporalis actu intelligibilis est, sicut et aliae formae, secundum quod a materia abstrahitur.” This 
thesis needs to be understood in a wider meaning of the word. We can find elsewhere the term for-
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We have to say right away that he substantially modifies it but never-
theless he keeps one of its essential features – it is a concept that allows 
a closer relation of form and matter.21 Their correlation is, with the help 
of this term, incorporated into the contents of each term that captures 
material being. This relation is shown not only by the fact that form as 
a form refers to matter but by the fact that the natural form or human 
soul itself, as a corporeal form, refers to matter. Thanks to this form we 
can consider materialness an essential feature which in Aristotleism came 
out of any form almost as a matter of fact.22 Form and matter are corre-
lative principles in Aristotle’s understanding. Here we can also mention 
that this resolution has substantial consequences in terms of the paradox 
between Aristotle’s metaphysics and psychology. If the concept of cor-
poreal form enables us to make materiality the essential definiteness or 
ma corporeitatis but it is not too common (9 cases in Index Thomisticus). It even seems that Thom-
as stops using it in his later work. However, this can be explained by the fact that it resembled too 
closely the theory of pluralism of forms and could easily lead to the thought that Thomas’s teaching 
does not differ much. The term forma corporeitatis itself, however, is not important. What is impor-
tant is the definition that captures this concept. Each form that results in three dimensions is a cor-
poreal form as the corporeal form is defined exactly like this by Avicenna.
21 This thesis must be understood in the context of the following considerations. We do 
not claim that matter was recognizable or had a form of its own.
22 We believe that such preserving of the concept of corporeal form corresponds to what 
later on gained the name transcendental relation or habitudo essentialis. These terms will have a spe-
cial use mainly in the individuation of a soul after its separation. If our reasoning is correct, it shows 
that the same problem or relation can be interpreted by Thomas Aquinas from the point of view 
of various conceptual definitions in terms of resolving various problems. Here we should add that 
the term of corporeal form will be abandoned by Thomas in time. The main reason is obvious; it is 
too closely related to the theory of the plurality of forms. For the mentioned concepts of the indi-
viduation of the human soul, compare with R. A. O’Donnell, C. S. P., Individuation: an example of 
the development in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, “The New Scholasticism” 33 (1959), p. 65–
66: “Precisely what type of relation is it which we predicate here of the human soul? St. Thomas in-
vents a special term to describe it: habitudo essentialis. Some modern Thomists think that the term 
transcendental relation describes it with precision. But what is a habitudo essentialis? What is a tran-
scendental relation? It is surely not a predicamental habit or relation; St. Thomas uses the adjective 
essentialis seemingly to distinguish it from a habitudo accidentalis. And all predicamental habits or 
relations are accidents. If it is not, then a relation which inherits accidentally in the separated hu-
man soul, it can only belong to the soul essentially. And since the soul is simple, this differs in no 
way from saying that it is identified with the essence of the soul.”
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essential feature, which could be expressed by making materiality one 
component of the contents of the concept and its definition, no relation 
to matter necessarily follows from form as such. We can of course argue 
that in Aristotle’s understanding, no relation of a form to matter neces-
sarily follows when the unmoved mover is a pure act. In this sense, we 
should, however, realize that it is primarily a possibility of thinking about 
more than one immaterial substance (intellects), mainly human intellect 
and the soul. This problem arose for instance in Avicebron’s work into 
introducing matter to intellect.
While reading the definition of essence by Thomas Aquinas, we es-
pecially need to keep in mind the following thesis:
Unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec 
tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit 
causa.23
In the text following this part we can find the actual explanation by 
Thomas Aquinas. We get acquainted with materia signata and materia 
non signata. The materia signata is a principle of individuation; it is con-
crete realized matter.24 The materia non signata is a part of the concept 
23 De ente, c. 2, 54–57.
24 Individuation represents a very wide question which, like the question of a soul, can 
to be interpreted from various points of view. A) On the level of accidents, the cause of individual-
ity is the accidents of quantity – realization of three dimensions. Nevertheless, the accidental lev-
el cannot explain individuality on the substantial level. The being of accidents is founded in being 
that they gain from the form. The b) level is then the individualization of the substance regardless of 
its three-dimensional realization. The latter one is only its accidental expression. Here we can look 
at the question from the point of view of two perspectives: i) hylemorphical and ii) metaphysical. 
Compare with J. Owens, Thomas Aquinas (B. CA. 1225; 1274), [in:] Individuation in scholasticism: 
the latter Middle Ages and the counter reformation, ed. J. J. E. Gracia, Albany 1994, p. 173: “It is part-
ly logical, namely, in the Porphyrian tree in which the predicates descend from the most universal 
down to the most specific in relation to the individual subject of which they are asserted or denied. 
It is partly in the realm of natural philosophy, in which the substantial form is received into matter 
and multiplied numerically by that reception. It is also metaphysical, insofar as individuation means 
the unity of a thing in itself and thereby its differentiation from others, for unity is a transcendental 
property that follows upon being.”
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and definition. Thomas Aquinas places the materia non signata into the 
definition of man, if it is a man indeed.25 
This explanation seems sufficient at first sight. However, it does not 
answer the question of how matter is in the essence of material things. 
This thesis seems to be in conflict with Thomas’s text which places the 
materia non signata into the essence of a human being, to the extent that 
he is man. That is the one that is only the content of the concept and the 
feature of the definition. However, we still need to ask: is this answer 
really sufficient? Is the affirmation of essence in the sense of whatness 
(quid), which is in the sense of essence captured by reason, referring to 
matter enough for us? The answer to this question was indicated in the 
introductory description of the possible meanings of the concept of es-
sence. We cannot forget that intelligibility is only the first of them. Our 
suspicion is confirmed below in the text where Thomas, following Avi-
cenna, also differentiates three basic meanings of the concept of essence 
or the three basic modes of essence. If we remain, rather, at the second 
mode, by which Thomas and not tradition, presents to us the question 
of essence, the main modes are these:
a) essence as it is in itself;26 
25 De ente, c. 2, 43–87: “Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta 
est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata; Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub de-
terminatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haec autem materia in diffinitione que est hominis, in quan-
tum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Sortis, si Sortes diffinitionem haberet. In 
diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata: non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur 
hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt materia hominis non signata. Sic ergo patet 
quod essentia hominis et essentia Sortis non differt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum.”
26 De ente, c. 3, 26–41: “Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considera-
ri: uno modo, secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius. Et hoc modo 
nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde quicquid aliorum 
attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. Verbi gratia, homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et 
animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt. Album vero aut nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod 
non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum 
ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est 
extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu 
eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Sorte. Similiter si unitas 
esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem Sortis et Platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari.” 
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b) essence in intellect; 
c) essence in things.27
We can put this division into connection with the statement of the 
presence of matter in the essences of material things. It seems, then, that 
the reasoning we have seen in Thomas Aquinas’s work so far relates rather 
to the first two modes. As far as the first mode is concerned, material-
ity undoubtedly also belongs to the essential features of material beings. 
Regarding the fact that this mode takes into account only what belongs 
to the being of a certain species as the being of this species, regardless of 
the modus of the being of this essence, regardless of whether we consider 
essence as capturable by intellect or essence as the ontological principle 
of the being, we can say that for this way of understanding essence the 
suggested explanation by Thomas on the presence of matter in essence is 
valid too. If we consider the essence of things as they are in intellect, then 
it follows that exactly this mode is the best suited for the explanation be-
ing explored. The third mode will then cause the biggest problems. The 
essence of a concrete thing is the principle accepting the concrete act or 
the principle of the concrete thing. We cannot consider it as common. 
In this sense, not even its potential parts, which are parts only because 
the essence as a whole is considered from a certain point of view, under-
stood as undefined in the sense in which Thomas Aquinas places indefi-
niteness against individuality. The genus stands indefinitely against the 
species and the species is undefined against the concrete.
Compare with E. C. Sweeney, Supposition, signification, and universals, “Freiburger Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie un Theologie” 42 (1995), p. 282–283.
27 De ente, c. 3, 52–67: “Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et 
aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia. Et in singulari-
bus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secun-
dum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. Falsum enim 
est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in 
hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, nunquam esset extra hoc singulare. Simi-
liter etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari, nunquam esset in 
eo. Sed verum est dicere quod homo non in quantum est homo habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel 
in illo aut in anima.”
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These considerations can be summarized in the following method. 
Thomas Aquinas is aware of the disputability of introducing matter into 
the essence of material beings. He offers an explanation of this disputabil-
ity, but only on the level of essence as an intellectually captured principle 
of being. We can consider the materia non signata a part of the defini-
tion or the feature defining the content of the concept. He provides an 
explanation of the presence of matter in essence that we understand as 
the principle of the concrete being only allusively in the currently ana-
lyzed place. However, it seems that we need to search for it in terms of 
his reception of the issue connected with the concept of corporeal form. 
The latter seems to correspond on the ontological level to the materia non 
signata or to essence, which we consider as signata.28 We will focus on 
the reception and usage of corporeal form below. This will then enable 
us to answer the question on the relation between the essence of a thing 
and the form. It is obvious that if we talk about the form, in the case of 
man we also talk about his soul. 
Corporeal form and related questions in De ente et essentia 
in connection with philosophical psychology
One of the most important consequences of introducing the con-
cept of corporeal form is undoubtedly the pluralism of forms. This, in 
the eyes of Thomas Aquinas, corrupts the unity of any being. In spite 
of this threat, Thomas Aquinas accepted the concept of corporeal form 
and used it. However, we must emphasize that his use gained a consid-
erably modified shape. We will see this best if we draw our attention to 
Thomas’s resolution of the question of the relation between the logical 
and ontological order. 
28 Compare with De ente, c. 2, 85–89: “Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia 
Sortis non differt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde Commentator dicit super VII 
metaphysicae: Sortes nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius.” Here 
we should mention that we do not consider accidents on the substantial level and thus not even the 
quantity. 
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A. Forest, in his still inspiring and important work La structure mé-
taphysique du concret selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin, described Avicebron 
as Thomas’s main opponent, whom he had faced already in De ente. The 
work that we are now examining is, according to the mentioned author, 
aimed against Avicebron.29 This critique leads the way to answering the 
question on the relation of common concepts to things. The fact that 
this question is the subject of examination in De ente is stated right in 
the introduction, where the relation between the essence of a thing and 
logical concepts represents one of the main issues.
Above we became acquainted with the concept of designation (desi-
gnatio). Within the relation of essence and common concepts, this ques-
tion has a privileged position. It differentiates the thomistic solution from 
the pluralistic solution. Thomas Aquinas continues the connection to 
the question of the presence of matter in the essence of material things. 
Like the materia non signata in the essence of material things, the spe-
cies is also in genus in an unidentified way. The capturing of this point 
is crucial for the whole of tomistic logics and metaphysics. A concept of 
form and essence that goes back to the original source, meaning to Aris-
totle, announces itself. According to this theory, no species is formed in 
a “mechanical” way, by practically composing the form determined by 
the genus concept and the form determined by the concept of specific 
difference. The definition can surely be divided into these concepts or 
parts, but the ontological order does not correspond to this division.30 
This is something we could express differently. The concept of genus 
and difference do not designate the form of genus or the form of differ-
ence. The concept of body (corpus) that we predicate about men as well 
29 A. Forest, La structure métaphysique du concret selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris 1956, 
p. 86: “On sait l’importance considérable que joue dans les discussions scolastiques la doctrine du 
Fons Vitae; le De Ente de saint Thomas est sans doute dans une très grande mesure une réponse au 
traité d´Avicebron qui venait d´être traduit.”
30 Compare with E. C. Sweeney, Supposition, signification, and universals, op. cit., p. 269: 
“For Aquinas the connection between language and being, specifically between signification, sup-
position, and different types of supposition, on the one hand, and the structure of the real, on the 
other, is not and could not be one of simple correspondence, partially because of the nature of lan-
guage, partially because of Aquinas’s metaphysics.”
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as about a stone does not designate in both cases the same form. If we 
take a look at a similar example in Avicenna’s or Avicebrona’s work, we 
find that the concept of corporeal form, that is the concept that defines 
the form constituting any material being, to the extent that it is, desig-
nates unequivocally corporeal form, which according to Thomas leads 
to the result that all beings except for one are only accidents. Such a re-
sult is of course not acceptable, albeit only from the ethical point of view. 
From this statement it follows that only the species concepts designate 
unequivocally a definite form. However, we cannot forget the question 
of the matter we were discussing above.
The topic we are going through is as important from the psycholo-
gical point of view as it is from the metaphysical and logical point of 
view. By refusing an unequivocal predication of the genus concepts and 
concepts of differences, Thomas, in his early work, stands evidently and 
substantively against such forms of dualism that arose from the eclec-
tic Aristotelism. The form that constitutes every being in due genus and 
species is not perfectio, no addition of already formally defined being. In 
this way he is getting back to the legacy of authentic Aristotelism also on 
the psychological level.
In connection with the analyzed problem, Thomas then in De ente 
provides an example which is, especially from the philosophical psy-
chology of Thomas Aquinas, extremely important. The example relates 
to the already mentioned concept of “body” (corpus). The body can be 
then understood in two ways according to Thomas:
a) The concept of a body designates the genus. In this way the concept 
designates every being regardless of whether any other perfection besides 
the three-dimensional realization arises from this body or not.31 In this 
sense, the body is predicated about man and also about stone. A note 
specifying and emphasizing that three dimensions alone are the body 
belonging to the category of quantity is essential. This note is essential 
31 De ente, c. 2, 135–140: “Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet 
rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quae-
cumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non.”
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in the sense that it reminds us on what level of the structure of being we 
are. The subject of the examination is not accidental but a substantial 
definition of being. In this sense, we only understand materiality alone, 
we cannot imagine it as the realization of three dimensions; this is alre-
ady a matter of quantity.32 We will repeat what is important: the genus 
concept of the body can be predicated about each being that possesses 
the possibility of three dimension realization. This possibility alone is 
shown by substantial forms of various species, which by the genus con-
cept of the body, are determined only in a non-defined way (implicite). 
If we performed an analysis of the concept of man for instance, based 
on how we see it in the Porphyrian tree, we would not do anything mo-
re than make a logical division which otherwise does not correspond to 
reality in the sense that every grade corresponds to a certain form ad-
ding additional perfection.
b) The concept of the body can be understood as designating only 
and exclusively the form out of which three dimensions arise.33 In this 
sense then, everything, which is extra, is beyond this understood con-
cept. It is most appropriate that Thomas, in relation to the body under-
stood this way, uses the term cum praecisione. This tells us that this way 
of understanding the body is not original but derived, although it also has 
its justification. It also shows us that from the point of view of Thomas’s 
theory of one substantial form, the body can be understood in this way 
only as cum praecisione. If we did the same in the system of Avicenna or 
Avicebron, we could not differentiate these two ways of understanding 
the body at all.
Now we can move on to the two related questions that Thomas ob-
serves from these two mentioned points of view – to corporeal form and 
32 De ente, c. 2, 110–115: “Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, di-
citur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres 
dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis.”
33 De ente, c. 2, 123–129: “Potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae 
habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecisione, 
ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter 
significationem corporis sic dicti.”
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the soul. In the analyzed section, we can see interesting features. In terms 
of the first concept, the following applies:
Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres 
dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex 
qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, 
sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia.34
We should understand this in the way that a) corporeal form or form 
which constitutes three dimensions can be understood as any form of 
material being; b) this thesis is important especially when applied to man’s 
soul. The soul of man is then the corporeal form (forma corporeitatis), 
the same as the form of a stone. We can, however, say this only because 
corporeal form (or body) does not declare itself unequivocally. The soul 
of man constitutes a man as a unity, including his body. Here we can 
mention the terms transcendental relation and habitudo essentialis. As the 
soul is indivisible, as we cannot point to any of its parts, it is as a whole 
corporeal form. This, however, does not mean anything else than that it 
naturally relates to matter. The character and the extent of this relation 
are not the subject of examination for the time being. 
In terms of the second concept, we reach a completely different un-
derstanding. With regards to corporeal form, we gain it only from the 
operation of the intellect (cum praecisione), which turns away from every-
thing except from the body itself. If we take a look at this question from 
the point of view of Thomas’s theory, we will find that we are looking at, 
to some extent, an artificial operation and the concept, which designates 
the form of a body. Understood in this way, it does not correspond to any 
form that in reality constitutes a material being. This way of understand-
ing the body, however, prominently resembles the theory of Avicenna 
and Avicebron. In these theories, it is absolutely natural to think about 
the body in the mentioned sense. 
34 De ente, c. 2, 142–148.
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We can summarize that the concept of the body can be described in 
two ways. We can define it as a general concept of all beings, which have 
such a form, or an essence which constitutes three dimensions. We can 
also define the body by defining it as a part of a whole. In the same way 
that the form of a human body does not consist of the sum of forms of 
its defined parts, the whole, which includes the body as its part, does not 
consist of such a constituted form. This means that the concept of the 
body understood in the second way does not designate corporeal form 
but only a part which is formed by a form of a whole (by a corporeal 
form, soul or other form of material beings), and if it designates a form, 
it is only indirectly through one and only of its features.
Let us now focus on the consequences that this understanding of 
a body has for the understanding of a soul. Let us compare two texts:
Et hoc modo corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis, quia sic anima erit 
praeter id quod significatum est nomine corporis et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, 
ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur 
animal.35
In substantiis igitur compositis, forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima 
et corpus.36
Here we can think about their mutual relation. At first sight their mu-
tual non-compatibility is obvious. The first text claims two things: a) the 
body is an integral part of man. The concept of the body however, as we 
shown above, defines cum praecisione as such a form which provides the 
possibility of realizing three dimensions and this only. In this sense, the 
body is a part which we can, with regards to the above said, define as 
consisting of form and matter. To be more precise, we could say that it 
consists of a form-soul and matter. This way of understanding the ques-
tion, however, does not comply with the way of understanding the part 
35 De ente, c. 2, 129–134.
36 De ente, c. 2, 1–2.
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of the body, cum praecisione, and with the first text, b) against the body 
understood in this way stands the soul as something that is above the 
realization of the three dimensions alone. In this sense, the body does 
not contain the soul but it relates to it as to its part. Here it can be help-
ful to once again move this to the ontological level. If the soul is out-
side of what the body is, and the body is yet still a formed part, what 
is the relation between the soul and this form? Since we know we are 
moving in the derived mode of understanding the concept of a body, it 
is obvious at first sight that the asked question should be directed only 
towards emphasizing the non-authenticity of this understanding of the 
relation between the body and the soul. If we wanted to take it seriously 
though, we would have to answer the question by saying the soul is and 
is not outside of the body. This problem is, however, unacceptable on 
the level where we try to capture the parts of the authentic whole. We 
need to change not only our understanding of the body but also its part, 
i.e. the soul. In the same way as we understand the body as a part that 
we define by corporeality, we need to define the soul as a part which 
overtakes or even excludes corporeality, i.e. the realization of three di-
mensions. If we understand the soul in this sense, we do not have to deal 
with the contradictory answer to the asked question. The soul in this 
sense is not a form of a body but at the same time it is an integral part 
of a man. In the case of a man, the soul understood in this way will be 
the part of the man, which is the holder or the subject of the intellect 
and the will, i.e. the events which fully overpass the possibilities of the 
purely material subject.
Let us now focus on the second text. It shows us the unproblematic 
position of hylemorphism regarding the psychological question. Soul 
is form. If we accepted Avicenna’s theory or the theory of his Latin fol-
lowers of the first half of the thirteenth century, we could unite this view 
with the previous one. Perfectio has always been in a certain sense the 
perfect act of the body; it was in a certain sense accepted by a relatively 
passive and mainly material and already formed subiectum. In the case 
of Thomas, we are not offered this step though. We have to take the men-
tioned thesis seriously with all its consequences. The soul is form and 
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body is matter, or also the first matter.37 The form in Thomas Aquinas’s 
understanding cannot relate to anything already formed. Even here the 
soul is completely outside of matter, but it gives the foundation of the 
whole man including his parts – any parts, e.g. a part that is a composi-
tion of both these principles and nothing else, or a part that is only one 
of them. The fact that we are talking about the soul and the body as the 
subjects of activities is perhaps obvious.
Let us now compare these two approaches. The hylemorphical way 
of defining the soul and the body is most fundamental. This is apparent 
for two reasons: 
a) with the help of the concepts of hylemorpical theory we can ex-
plain the concept of the soul and the body as integral parts. The body is 
a material part of man which is already a constituted whole of the form-
-soul and matter. The soul is then a form to the extent that three dimen-
sions and also other potencies arise from it, especially intellect and will. 
The hylemorphical soul is then on both sides of the analysis, although 
understood differently, of the integral parts (soul and body) of a man. 
b) the concept of the soul of man as a form designates unequivocally 
the species form of man which is something we cannot say about the 
concept of the form of the soul as an integral part. The concepts of soul 
and body understood as integral parts do not designate unequivocally 
any form. This is perhaps the aspect from which we understand man. 
This view will be quite precisely developed later on in the first question 
of Questiones disputatae de anima.
The analysis of the understanding of general concepts brought us to 
two topics which are important, as we have just observed, from the point 
of the widely understood psychological issue. For one thing, we again 
encountered the question of the unity and plurality of substantial forms, 
to which Thomas provided an explanation on the semantic-ontological 
level, and for another, we have already encountered an explicit definition 
of two different ways of understanding the soul and body of man. In the 
37 Compare with: B. C. Bazán, The highest encomium of human body, [in:] Littera, sensus, 
sententia. Studi in onore del prof. C. J. Vansteenkiste, a cura di A. Lobato, Milano 1991, p. 99–116.
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context of De ente et essentia, however, we need to think through the par-
tially analyzed relation between the soul as a form and the essence of man.
Form, essence and soul
A good deal of what has been said seems to imply that essence cannot 
be identified with form. As the first argument against such an identification 
we can surely recall Thomas’s already-mentioned words emphasizing that 
the essence of material beings is not only form but also matter. Another 
objection could take into account the difference of levels on which the in-
dividual principles find their use. We could also object, and this is closely 
connected to what was mentioned just before, that while form is related to 
matter, essence is related to its being. Essence is defined as a potentiality 
against its correlative principle; form is, however, in relation to its co-princi-
ple, an act. In the following text, we will try to answer some of these objec-
tions and point out the fact that none of them represents a major obstacle 
to understanding the essence of material things as identical to their form. 
Although Thomas Aquinas, in De ente et essentia, in a certain sense 
places the essence of material things against their form, claiming that es-
sence is more than just a form as it contains matter besides other things, 
it is also clear that their differentiation will not be totally distinct either 
for Thomas for the following reasons: 
a) While defining various meanings of the concepts of essence that we 
can find in the philosophic tradition we became acquainted several times 
with how essence can be understood as form. This alone is certainly not 
very persuasive. We must however consider two facts. Thomas Aquinas 
did not deny any of the mentioned understandings as unjustified. Most 
certainly not the one which would identify form and essence. Further-
more, it is evident from the text of De ente that Thomas Aquinas hesitates 
a bit in how much these two concepts have a truly different meaning.38 
38 De ente, c. 2, 83–291: “Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur 
quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et ma-
teriae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est to-
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We can account for this by reasoning that Thomas, in De ente, overpass-
es the boundaries of hylemorphism to which, however, he still holds.39 
Finally, we could also add a certain terminological distinction of the 
forms, which Thomas implements later. Aristotle’s form, which does not 
contain matter, is captured by Thomas as a forma partis, the essence or 
the form which captures the matter as a forma totius.40
b) In the case of spiritual beings, essence is the same as form. The soul 
of man is immaterial. The soul of man is a form of his body. The form of 
the human body is then the essence of man.41
c) The presence of matter, where matter is understood in the intelligible 
way, in essence – that means also in the human soul – can be explained 
by means of the concept of corporeal form (forma corporeitatis).42
tum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est ma-
teria designari.”; De ente, c. 4, 79–84: “Secunda differentia est quod essentiae rerum compositarum 
ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde con-
tingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero.”
39 Let’s add this comment here. The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas combines the theory 
of real distinction and hylemorphism on the basis of two presuppositions: a) the change in under-
standing of corporeal form (forma corporeitatis) enables the understanding of materiality in an in-
telligible way which is expressed by the fact that essence contains also matter; b) by using the basic 
hylemorphical description of a form: forma dat esse. Compare with C. Fabro, La nozione metafisica 
di partecipazione secondo S. Thomaso d’Aquino, 3ʳᵈ ed., Turin 1963, p. 341–342; E. C. Sweeney, Sup-
position, signification, and universals, op. cit., p. 283.
40 On terms forma totius and forma partis, see J. F. Wippel, The metaphysical thought of 
Thomas Aquinas, Washington 2000, p. 202; fn. 15; A. Maurer, Form and essence in the philosophy 
of St. Thomas, op. cit., p. 165–76; compare with In V Metaphysic., lect. 9: “Quartum modum ponit 
ibi amplius quod dicit quod etiam quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, dicitur substantia uniu-
scuiusque. Haec autem quidditas sive rei essentia, cuius definitio est ratio, differt a forma quam dixit 
esse substantiam in secundo modo, sicut differt humanitas ab anima. Nam forma est pars essentiae 
vel quidditatis rei. Ipsa autem quidditas vel essentia rei includit omnia essentialia principia. Et ideo 
genus et species dicuntur esse substantia eorum, de quibus praedicantur, hoc ultimo modo. Nam 
genus et species non significant tantum formam, sed totam rei essentiam.” 
41 This argument also applies when considering the dual understanding of a soul as a prin-
ciple of the activities and form of a whole. As a form of a whole, the soul is material, of course only 
regarding the extent to which it is a corporeal form, and of course also immaterial, both to the extent 
to which it is a form and also to the extent to which it performs activities not dependent on matter. 
Being a subject of the activities of the intellect and the will to perform these activities is divergent. 
42 De ente, c. 2, 142–148: “Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poter-
ant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex 
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d) With regards to various levels of philosophical discourse, the ob-
jection can be used to the benefit of our interpretation. The concept of 
form and essence, therefore, refers only to the context in which we are 
to examine the intelligible principle of the being. In the introductory 
part of De ente et essentia we observed that the basic feature of essence is 
intelligibility and thus also definiteness. In relation to this we also men-
tioned that although it is a trivial character of the examined principle, 
qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animali-
tas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis contine-
tur, prout corpus est genus eius.” The term matter understood in the intelligible way does not make 
a good impression at first sight. It seems a breakage of the basic thomistic principles related to the 
first matter and its feature seems to announce itself. We, however, have to emphasize several facts: 
a) Thomas Aquinas refused the pluralism of forms; b) he, however, in his thinking for some reason 
preserved the term corporeal form (forma corporeitatis) or its definition; c) even the first matter to 
the extent to which it is created must depend on the intellect of God. Compare with De Ver., q. 3, 
a. 5: “Quamvis materia prima sit informis, tamen inest ei imitatio primae formae, quantumcumque 
enim debile esse habeat, illud tamen est similitudo primi entis, et secundum hoc potest habere si-
militudinem in Deo;” De Ver., q. 3, a. 5: “Nos autem ponimus materiam esse causatam a Deo; unde 
necesse est ponere quod aliquo modo sit eius idea in Deo, cum quidquid ab ipso causatur, similitu-
dinem ipsius utcumque retineat. Sed tamen, si proprie de idea loquamur, non potest poni quod ma-
teria prima habeat per se ideam in Deo distinctam ab idea formae vel compositi: quia idea proprie 
dicta respicit rem secundum quod est producibilis in esse; materia autem non potest exire in esse 
sine forma, nec e converso. Unde proprie idea non respondet materiae tantum, neque formae tan-
tum; sed toti composito respondet una idea, quae est factiva totius et quantum ad formam et quan-
tum ad materiam.” This cannot be reached directly in any other way than by implementing the term 
of corporeal form, which would, however, capture the corporeal unequivocally. This is, however, 
something Thomas obviously refuses. The corporeal form is then understood as any form which is 
defined by three dimensions. In this sense, the pluralism of forms is excluded and what remains is 
a minimal recognizability, that is the intelligibility of the first matter, which is, however, only medi-
ated. The first matter is not recognizable directly as it does not have a form on its own but it is rec-
ognizable indirectly to the extent to which various material forms provide it with being, to the ex-
tent to which it is its act. For more on this matter, please compare with A. Maurer, Form and essence 
in the philosophy of St. Thomas, op. cit., p. 175: “What is more, it now becomes possible to see that 
matter enters into essence even regarded from the viewpoint of intelligibility. The existence of each 
being is a gift of God, created out of nothing according to an intelligible pattern which is a divine 
idea. In the case of material being, matter forms a part of that intelligible pattern. So even though 
strictly speaking there is no divine idea of prime matter, for in itself it neither exists nor is know-
able, still there is a divine idea of the composite, which includes prime matter. Although unintelli-
gible in itself, prime matter is thus essential to the full intelligibility of the composite and enters in 
full right into the essence of a material being.”
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we still have to keep it in mind. Here we can use this feature and also 
the role of essence. Essence corresponds to form precisely in its intelligi-
bility. These are principles that are primarily determined as intelligible, 
recognizable and as defining being. There is no reason to distinguish 
them. Their diverse definition, be it with the help of the terms of essence 
or form, really relates to the level on which we examine this intelligible 
principle. Form belongs to the physical framework and essence to the 
metaphysical one. As the two frameworks are different, the context in 
which we find the principle of the certitudo of each being is also differ-
ent. This interpretation corresponds to how Thomas defines the subject 
of metaphysics.43 
These considerations empower us to think about the human soul as 
of an essence. This has one important consequence. The soul can be 
43 Thomas’s understanding of metaphysics arises from Aristotle’s understanding of this 
philosophical field. Aristotle, however, defined the subject of metaphysics in two ways: a) the sub-
ject of metaphysics is a being as a being – ontological concept of metaphysics; b) the subject of 
meta physics is an immobile and separated being, God – theological concept of metaphysics. A tra-
ditional ontological definition was advocated by Avicenna and the theological one by Averroes. 
Thomas Aquinas then puts both concepts into a synchrony. The subject of metaphysics is a being 
as a being (ens inquantum est ens) and its principles (principia). Recognition of the principles is in-
separable from the recognition of the examined subject. The principles of a being are then accord-
ing to Thomas of two kinds: a) complete natures and b) incomplete natures. This division is impor-
tant. Complete natures are a cause or principle of the being in the causal sense (per causalitatem). 
Incomplete naturalness is common through predication (per praedicationem), i.e. belonging to all 
the members of a species. Metaphysics thus, according to Thomas, deals with its subject – the being 
as a being – and its causes. These causes, that is immaterial beings and incomplete causes, are not 
alone this subject. Should that be the other way round, metaphysics would have lost its universal 
(and its ontological) character. For our examination of being, the principles in the sense of incom-
plete natures are also very important. By these principles we understand the essence and the exis-
tence which belong to all beings to the extent to which they are beings. The subject of metaphysics 
is the being to the extent to which it is a being, regardless of materiality, from the point of view of 
its principles which is in the aspect of causality the God and in the aspect of internal metaphysical 
structure or predication the essence and existence (potentia et actus sunt prima principia in genere 
substantiae). This way the soul enters the framework of the examination of metaphysics, to the ex-
tent to which it is the incomplete nature founding the being. In any case it is obvious that matter in 
metaphysics finds itself outside the principles. Matter does not belong to the being as a being. On 
the subject of metaphysics compare with Thomas Aquinas, In Boeth. De Trin, 5. 1; Qodl. 3, 8, 20; 
J. F. Wippel, Metaphysical themes in Thomas Aquinas, Washington 1984, p. 55–67. 
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analyzed on the metaphysical level. To be more precise we can say that 
the real distinction gains an anthropological-psychological importance 
from the point of view of our understanding of the issue. It even seems 
that without this dimension of the psychological issue, some of its parts 
are not comprehensive at all in Thomas Aquinas’ work. Here we mean 
mainly the problem of explaining the ontological status of the separated 
soul or also its two definitions as a form of body and intellect provided 
that the soul is indivisible. The analysis of this problem, however, over-
passes the framework of De ente et essentia. From this statement it is ob-
vious that we now need to turn to the purely metaphysical issue of the 
composition of being from essence and being. Our identification of form 
with essence uncovers this authentic space of the psychological examina-
tion without settling on the theses of subsistence.
Real distinction in De ente et essentia
The refusal of universal hylemorphism brought Thomas Aquinas to 
the original problem of founding and explaining the radical distinction 
between the creation and the Creator.44 Avicenna’s solution, as is shown 
by its dominant presence in De ente, which differentiates the thing in 
relation to itself and in relation to the necessary being (necesse esse), of-
fered Thomas Aquinas a certain lead. However, it cannot be said that he 
accepted Avicenna’s solution fully. Here we should mention especially the 
relation of essence and form which is distinctively different in Thomas’s 
and Avicenna’s understanding.
Certain indications of differentiating the aspects quo est and quod est 
had already occurred in the philosophical tradition since Aristotle’s time. 
The distinctions in individual concepts are, however, extensive. The terms 
44 Compare with A. Forest, La structure metaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas 
d’Aquin, op. cit., p. 128: “Mais il se voit obligé, pour marquer l’opposition entre la simplicité de la 
nature divine et les caractères des natures créés, de chercher dans les créatures une nouvelle forme 
de distinction qui ne se ramène pas à celle de la matière et de la forme.”
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quo est and quod est could define various aspects of being as, for instance, 
the relation to God or form and matter.45 Avicenna’s solution is from out 
45 Thomas Aquinas could follow at least a few sources: a) Aristotle in Posterior Analytics 
(Anal. Post., II, 7, 92 b. 10; Metaphys., VIII, 3, 1043; Phys. IV, 1, 208 and 29) distinguishes two differ-
ent aspects in knowing certain things: the knowledge of what a thing is and whether it is; b) Boethi-
us see Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet II, q. 2 a. 1 co.: “Et ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa crea-
tura quae habet esse, et ipsum esse eius; et hoc est quod Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdomad. quod 
in omni eo quod est citra primum, aliud est esse et quod est.”; Contra Gentiles, II, 54; Boethius, De 
Trinitate, PL 64, p. 1250 c: “Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est, atque ideo unum est id 
quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt; unumquodque enim habet esse cum his ex quibus 
est id est partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae conjunctae, sed non hoc vel hoc sin-
gulariter: ut, cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est, non vel corpus 
vel anima.”; c) some thinkers of the 13ᵗʰ century as for instance Alexandr Halensis, Bonaventura, 
Philip the Chancellor. Bonaventura also differenciates quod est and quo est. However this distinc-
tion only captures the relation of a being to God. Compare with Bonaventura, In II Sent., (Quarac-
chi, 1882–1902), d. 3., p. 3., p. 1, a. 1., q. 1: “Certum est angelum non habere essentiam simplicem 
per privationem omnis compositionis: certum est enim quod angelus compositus est compositio-
ne multiplici. Potest enim considerari in comparatione ad sui principium, et sic in tantum est com-
positus, inquantum habet ad ipsum dependentiam. Simplicissimum enim absolutum est, et omne 
dependens hoc ipso cadit in aliquam compositionem, quia differt quo est et quid est. Habet secun-
do considerari in comparatione ad suum effectum, et sic habet componi ex substantia et et poten-
tia. Habet nihilominus considerari ut ens in genere, et sic secundum metaphysicum componitur ex 
actu et potentia; secundum logicum vero ex genere et differentia. Item habet considerari ut ens in 
se: et sic, quantum ad esse actuale, est in ipso compositio entis et esse; quantum ad esse essentiale 
componitur ex quo est et quod est; quantum ad esse individuale, sive personale, sic in illo reperi-
tur quod est et quis est. Cum ergo angelica essentia dicatur simplex, hoc non est per privationem 
harum compositionum, sed hic certum est aliquas compositiones removeri a substantia angeli, ut-
pote compositionem ex partibus quantitativis, et compositionem ex partibus heterogeneis, et com-
positionem ex naturali corporali et spirituali, qualis est in homine. Sed de compositione materiae 
et formae, sive materialis et formalis de hoc dubium est.”; Alexandr Halensis uses similarly to Bo-
naventura conceptual pair of quo est and quod est to express the dependency of the being on God. 
Compare with Summa Theol., (Quaracchi, 1924–1948), IIa P. Inq. 1. Tr. 2, q. 3, cap. 3, a. 1. p. 75: 
“Sed adhuc posset objici loquendo de unitate aut forma secundum se ipsam accepta intelligitur enim 
forma creata non indigens materia: constat quod huiusmodi forma creata esset; aut ergo esset sim-
plex aut composita. Simplex omnino non potest esse, cum hoc soli Deo conveniat unde Augustinus 
in libro De Civ. Dei: “Ideo simplex dicitur, quia quod habet, hoc est quod habet;” unde “natura di-
citur simplex cui non sit aliquid habere quod possit amittere nec aliud sit babens et id quod habe-
tur” (XI, 10). Forma ergo ista, cum non sit simplex, erit composita; ergo altero duorum; sed non est 
ex aliis constituta nec cum alio possita ad constituendum tertium; Ergo non est composita. Prop-
ter hoc addendum est ut compositum etiam dicatur non tantum uno duorum modorum supra di-
ctorum sed cuius esse est dependens ab alio et intellectus dependet ab intellectu. Licet ergo partes 
non habeat nec pars alterius sit nihilominus tamen compositus dicitur propter sui dependentiam 
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of all of the others closest to Thomas. He consistently realizes that he 
overpasses the narrow boundaries of hylemorphism and establishes the 
metaphysical composition into every being outside of God. Already in 
De ente Thomas elaborates this distinction in his own way and keeps it 
as a constant part of his philosophy. We will now focus on his argumen-
tation in De ente in more detail.
In chapter four Thomas provides his arguments to advocate the dis-
tinction of being and essence in intellects, i.e. in angels and souls. Here 
we should certainly mention two contexts mentioned by Thomas: 
a) The context of Aristotle’s psychology and the theory of cognition 
which unequivocally defines intellects as essentially immaterial; 
b) Avicebron, who is defined here by Thomas as the father of univer-
sal hylemorphism, stands against this basic understanding of intellects.46 
Thomas reserves a space for these two concepts in his further exami-
nation. If we want to explain a larger number of intellects and at the same 
time keep the requirement on their immateriality as is the consequence 
of Aristotle’s noetic theory, we need to offer an alternative not only to 
universal hylemorphism but also to Aristotle’s hylemorphism. This al-
ternative is, then, the distinction between the essence of a thing and its 
being.47 The fact that it is a distinction, which truly grasps the structure 
of being, is outlined already in the first argument, which proceeds in the 
following way:
in esse et intellectu. Accipiendo ergo compositum aliquo trium modorum, dicetur omnis creatura 
composita nec alio modo potest intelligi.”; d) Liber de Causis, compare. De ente, c. 4, 33–40: “Unde 
in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipia-
tur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus, sed est ibi compositio formae et esse. Unde in 
commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse, et 
accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quiditate vel natura simplici.”
46 De ente, c. 4, 1–22.
47 On justification of the real distinction compare with J. F. Wippel, Aquinas route to real 
distinction: a note to “De ente et essentia”, “The Thomist” 43 (1979), p. 275–295; id., The metaphysi-
cal thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 138–145; J. Owens, Stages and distinction in “De ente”: a rejoin-
der, “The Thomist” 45 (1981), p. 99–123; L. Sweeney, Existence/essence in Thomas Aquinas’s early 
writings, “Proceeding in the American Catholic Philosophical Association” 37 (1963), p. 97–130; 
H. R. Klocker, Two Quodlibets on essence/existence ,“The Thomist” 46 (1982), p. 267–282.
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Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intel-
ligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen 
ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura.48
In this argument we need to keep in mind two things: a) Thomas 
had already shown, in relation to the plurality of forms, that the order 
of thinking does not unequivocally correspond to the ontological order. 
That is why not even this text can be considered a valid and convincing 
argument.49 Nevertheless b) the definition itself of essence and especial-
ly its modes is to a considerable extent connected with a certain spe-
cific understanding of being. Here we have in mind mainly Avicenna’s 
definition of it as an accident.50 With this being (esse) is placed outside 
and also against essence as its main correlative principle. But what does 
accidentality on the level of substance principles mean? Accidents are 
predicated by substance which is not, however, in the considerations 
of the substance principles constituted. It seems that Avicenna had in 
mind accident in the sense of not belonging to the content of the con-
cept. We could speak of accidentality in the logical not the ontological 
sense. Thus, the mentioned argument can be also understood as logi-
cal not metaphysical. It seems that Thomas follows Avicenna in these 
boundaries and it is this character, which is common to all the concepts 
48 De ente, c. 4, 98–103.
49 In the work of Thomas’s later period, this argument, which is called intellectus essen-
tiae, is not to be found, which can lead us to the idea that Thomas very soon realized the problem 
of passing from the conceptual level to the ontological level. In the evaluation of this problem, two 
more important views on the value of the intellectus essentiae argument arose: a) A. Forest evalu-
ates it only as logical and in compliance with the ambiguous correspondence between the order of 
thinking and the ontological order. Compare with A. Forest, La structure metaphysique du concret 
selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, op. cit., p. 148: “Mais cet argument, on le voit, ne permet pas à la ri-
gueur d’afirmer l’existence d’une distinction réelle; on ne dit pas du tout que l’essence soit une réali-
té, ni qu’elle compose à ce titre avec l’existence; de tels textes pourraient fort bien s’interpréter dans 
l’hypothèse d’une simple distinction de raison fondée.”; John F. Wippel considers this argument the 
first step in the framework of a wider argumentation. Compare with J. F. Wippel, Aquinas route to 
real distinction: a note to “De ente et essentia”, op. cit., p. 287.
50 Compare with A. Forest, La structure metaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas 
d’Aquin, op. cit., p. 148.
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of beings, except for the non-created one, and he uses it in the second, 
this time full argument.
Being is thus accidental, i.e. it does not belong to any content of the 
concept of created beings. Here again we should emphasize that this alone 
does not have any ontological consequences in the sense that being would 
become an accident in the common sense of the word. Nevertheless, this 
thesis does not apply to being that would be being alone, absolutely sole 
and indivisible, i.e. where being and essence would be identical. Such 
a being could then be only one and that is because multiplying can be 
reached only by these three methods: a) by adding the difference, i.e. the 
way in which divided intellects multiply; b) by accepting matter, i.e. the 
way in which material beings of the same species multiply; c) by accept-
ing what is otherwise absolute, i.e. in the way in which the features that 
have a foundation in one idea multiply.51
A thing which is the being itself cannot multiply according to these 
methods: a) by adding the difference it would not be identical with itself 
but a being and some form; b) accepting matter would be even more un-
reasonable if we realize that matter is a pure potentiality and mainly what 
is through something other, through a form; only c) seems to offer an 
answer. This one, however, does not tell us that it is possible to multiply 
absolute being but the other way round. Everything, which is absolute 
in relation to something else, as for example absolute heat would be in 
relation to hot things, can be only one. Everything else is then something 
which participates in the absolute and which accepts it in some way. The 
hot thing is then not only heat but something which has heat. It is the 
same with being. Only God is an absolute being which can be only one 
51 De ente, c. 4, 103–113: “Nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse; et 
haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per 
additionem alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species, vel per hoc quod for-
ma recipitur in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diversis individuis, vel per hoc 
quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus, esset 
alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione.”
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and is absolutely indivisible. On the other hand, in this sense everything 
must be composed, it must be quo est and quod est.52
All these considerations, according to Thomas, are valid if we acknowl-
edge that existence applies only to the concept of God. The introductory 
part was based on the hypothetical assumption, which is shown not only 
by the structure of the argument but also by the use of lexical means. It 
requires addition.53
Form is a principle of all features of things, accidental or substantial. If 
being was caused only by form in the sense that existence would belong to 
the content of the concept which captures this form, this thing would be 
the cause of itself, which is obviously impossible. So being cannot follow 
on from form as its principle but only from something else, which is the 
cause of all other beings. This cause must be, however, only one and existing 
alone otherwise we would go on endlessly in the case of many causes. This 
reason refers to the Originator of being which can therefore be only one.54
This argument can be summarized in the following way. Let us imagine 
such a being whose concept is identical with existence. It arises from the 
assumption that it can be only one. It cannot be multiplied by either add-
ing the difference nor accepting matter, nor by the method of accepting 
52 De ente, c. 4, 113–119: “Si autem ponatur aliqua res, quae sit esse tantum, ita ut ipsum 
esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentiae, quia iam non esset esse tantum, sed 
esse et praeter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem materiae, quia iam esset esse non 
subsistens sed materiale. Unde relinquitur quod talis res, quae sit suum esse, non potest esse nisi una.”
53 The provided argument is followed by what seems to be the proof of the existence of 
God. There are different opinions in considering the importance of this step in argumentation to the 
benefit of the real distinction. Compare with J. F. Wippel, The metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas, 
op. cit., p. 295: “The impossibility of there being more than one being in which essence and existence 
are identical is sufficient ground for him to conclude to their factual otherness in all else.” J. Owens, 
Stages and distinction in “De ente”: a rejoinder, op. cit., p. 123: „[…] contrary to Wippel’s view Aqui-
nas rather needs to and does presuppose the existence of God in order to conclude to real otherness of 
essence and existence in other entities.”
54 De ente, c. 4, 127–137: “Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex princi-
piis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine, vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in 
aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quidi-
tate rei (dico sicut a causa efficiente) quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res seipsam in 
esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam 
natura sua habeat esse ab alio.”
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anything else which we could express by saying it is impossible that two 
absolute instances of the same would exist. Based on these assumptions, 
everything excluding the first being which is a being identical to itself has 
to reach a certain non-unity, a non-unity between being and essence. The 
reason why there cannot be more beings whose concepts would contain 
existence is the fact that such a being would then be a cause of itself. It 
would be and would not be at the same time. The reason for implement-
ing a real distinction is the presumption of the identity of essence and 
existence in God and the impossibility of a similar identity being realized 
in more than one case. What is important is that the structure of being 
composed in this way is not bound to a hylemorphical theory. However, 
as it follows from Aristotle’s theory of cognition, he must actually overpass 
hylemorphism in order to avoid a certain disharmony between Aristot-
le’s psychology and metaphysics. It is also necessary to emphasize that 
although Thomas gives a basis to a real distinction within the ontological 
structure of separated beings, this structure does not apply only to these 
beings but to all of them, i.e. also the material ones.55
If we have the philosophical or metaphysical field of the analysis of 
a being widened in this way, there are certain consequences for the frame-
work we went over, i.e. hylemorphism. Let us now focus on the changes 
that occur.
1) Its being is to the essence of a thing as the act is to the potency. 
Here we encounter an interesting problem which, however, helps us to 
rather confirm the necessity to differentiate between metaphysical and 
physical contexts. In the physical context it applies that form is what gives 
being, form is definitely defined as an act. Should we simplify the situa-
tion and forget about the difficulties of explaining more intellects within 
hylemorphism and consider only them, then only their forms, which are 
non-problematically identical with essences, to be at the same time de-
fined as an act and also as potency. From the point of view of what has 
been said this does not seem to be very counterintuitive, always relates 
55 Compare with J. F. Wippel, Aquinas route to real distinction: a note to “De ente et es-
sentia”, op. cit., p. 290.
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the form to something else. This aspect is even more obvious in the forms 
of material things. If we consider form as an act, we relate it to matter, 
but if we consider it as potency, we relate it to being. This also shows us 
that the definition of form as an act which is principal within the frame-
work of hylemorphism is literally highly relativized in Thomas’s work. 
This brings us back to the common character of all forms and essences, 
to their definiteness, which is in De ente still further stated. This seems 
to be another significant change in the understanding of form. The dual 
definition of the intelligible principle of being defines two frameworks 
of considering things. The soul can be understood as an act in relation to 
matter. This way we situate it into the order of change, mainly nature. The 
soul can then be understood as potency, as a principle accepting being 
which this way founds on the most basic level a man in his entirety. On 
this level his unity, the unity of “nature”, shows itself in the clearest way, 
i.e. non-problematically. The soul as essence regardless of the problem 
of inherence in matter founds all its potencies.
2) The potency allows grading. The hierarchical order of forms and 
essences alone is not new in the tradition and certainly not in the hy-
lemorphical tradition. In our context, however, it is important that the 
corporeal form (forma corporeitatis) or corporeality can be captured on 
the metaphysical level as a rightly determined extent of potency. The cor-
poreal forms of beings are in a higher potency than the forms of intellects. 
This potency of theirs reaches such an extent that it cannot be filled by 
only one representative of the given species. Their multiplication within 
species is then necessary. This can take place only through material real-
ization. From the metaphysical point of view, we do not need to under-
stand materiality in any other way than as a necessary condition for this 
multiplying. This of course narrows to a certain extent the gap between 
the spiritual and the material world. This is in accordance with Thomas’s 
hierarchical view of reality. In any case, it is in accordance with under-
standing man as horizon et confinium corporeorum et incorporeorum.56
56 Contra Gentiles, II, c. 68: “Est igitur accipere aliquid supremum in genere corporum, 
scilicet corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum, quod attingit ad infimum superioris generis, 
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As mentioned above, De ente contains the basic and most general 
principles, which unchanged, will further on define the philosophy of 
Thomas Aquinas. We can still, however, claim that in certain aspects we 
can find in him, in De ente at least, a slight hesitation. This relates es-
pecially to the relation of the concepts of form and essence. As we saw 
above, their distinction, although mentioned several times, is often lit-
erally obscured. This obscurity can be explained by the fact that in De 
ente Thomas confronts and also links two systems – hylemorphical and 
metaphysical – working with a real distinction. Within this endeavor, 
tensions necessarily had to emerge. This applies especially if we realize 
that both of them are preserved.57
Conclusion
In the introduction of this article we distinguished these three require-
ments: a) historical-philosophical coherence, b) metaphysical coherence, 
and c) psychological coherence. Now we can conclude that our interpre-
tation complies with these requirements:
a) The identification of form with essence by Thomas Aquinas respects 
a wider historical-philosophical development of the question of the intel-
ligible principle of being. It does not tell us that Aristotle’s form is the same 
scilicet ad animam humanam, quae tenet ultimum gradum in genere intellectualium substantia-
rum, ut ex modo intelligendi percipi potest. Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi 
quidam horizon et confinium corporeorum et incorporeorum, inquantum est substantia incorpo-
rea, corporis tamen forma. Non autem minus est aliquid unum ex substantia intellectuali et mate-
ria corporali quam ex forma ignis et eius materia, sed forte magis: quia quanto forma magis vincit 
materiam, ex ea et materia efficitur magis unum.”
57 Above we were discussing how it is possible that essence as primarily the intelligi-
ble principle would contain matter. Thomas in De ente explicitly states that the essence of material 
things contains both, matter and form. In De ente, c. 5, 131–140 he, however, also writes: “Tertio 
modo invenitur essentia in substantiis compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus et esse est recep-
tum et finitum, propter hoc quod ab alio esse habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas earum est re-
cepta in materia signata. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius, et in eis iam propter divisionem 
materiae signatae possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum in una specie. Et in his qualiter se habet 
essentia ad intentiones logicas, supra dictum est.” The extensive semantic closeness of the concepts 
of form and essence is shown by the fact that being is considered to be accepted. 
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as Thomas’s essence, it tells us that Thomas’s concept of a form changes. 
It changes with regards to the widening of the framework of which it is 
a part. Aristotle’s hylemorphism relates, as the name of this theory sug-
gests, to material reality. All forms (except for the form of the unmoved 
mover) are forms forming matter. We could say that they are related to 
matter not with its intelligible content but with its system. In the case of 
Thomas Aquinas, the situation is a bit different. Form as a form of itself 
does not refer to matter. This relation must be expressed in a different 
way, by content. Material form is not material form because it is a form 
but because it is such a form. From the historical-philosophical point of 
view this step is ensured by accepting and transforming the concept of 
corporeal form which, as we have already mentioned, has a completely 
different meaning than in the pluralism of forms theory.
b) Thomas’s thesis that the essence of material beings is not only form 
and not only matter is problematic. We need to ask how it is possible 
that the intelligible principle contains something from the definition of 
the non-intelligible. Here again the examination of the acceptance and 
modification of the concept of corporeal form has a distinct interpreta-
tion value. It is its modification that is especially important, as it tells us 
that the relation to matter can be expressed by the extent of imperfec-
tion of forms or essence. In this sense, all our interpretation of the es-
sence of material beings falls into the context of Thomas’ hierarchic and 
continual universe. 
c) From the psychological point of view, it shows that if we identify 
Thomas’s form with essence, we are identifying the human soul with its 
essence. The advantage of this interpretation is the fact that this corporeal 
and intellectual unity, this horizon et confinium, can be captured in a very 
unproblematic way on the metaphysical level as the materiality of man 
can be expressed by the extent of the imperfection of its essence which is 
fully in compliance with the concept of metaphysics which, besides oth-
ers, deals with incomplete natures. We can also express this in a different 
way. The identification of the soul with essence on the metaphysical level 
will enable us to introduce in compliance the presupposition of the soul 
which is whole in the whole body and its parts (the souls as substantial 
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form), the presupposition of the soul which as the fundament of thinking 
cannot be form fully plunged into matter (non est totaliter comprehensa 
ab ea) and the presupposition of the indivisibility of the soul.
The contemplations above show that it is worth considering the out-
lined interpretation and that it can represent a starting point for further 
fruitful examination of Thomas’s thinking.
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